I. INTRODUCTION
Since the leaking of the Panama Papers, tax evasion has received increased attention in the UK (and elsewhere). The recognition that banks and law firms had facilitated the evasion of taxes by their clients preceded the passing of the Criminal Finances Act 2017 (CFA).
1 Among other things, the CFA has introduced corporate offences of failure to prevent the facilitation of tax evasion, which explicitly address the aid to tax evasion provided by corporate bodies such as banks.
In Germany, corporate liability in relation to tax evasion has also been the focus of public and state attention in recent years. However, in comparison to the UK, corporate criminal liability does not exist in Germany. There is only the possibility of imposing regulatory fines on corporate entities, including banks.
This article will first examine the German approach to liability of banks for aiding tax evasion before considering the UK corporate offences of failure to prevent the facilitation of tax evasion. The relevant German law will be covered in greater detail, as its content is likely to be less familiar to readers. This will be followed by a direct comparison of the respective laws, with particular focus on their effectiveness in various respects. Such analysis is of particular value at the present time, given that the reform of the German law has been announced in the 2018 coalition agreement of the governing parties. 2 Clearly, the liability mechanisms used in the UK and Germany are forms of regulating the risk of tax evasion, due to its concomitant negative economic and social consequences. 3 An effective regime of bank liability in this context ought to involve stringent internal procedures, which should help limit the possibility that a bank's services will be used by a party when evading tax. As such, comparing the German and UK regimes can help identify varying ways in which tax evasion risks can be managed and regulated, and enable us to ascertain the respective merits of these approaches.
II. GERMANY: THE REGULATORY LIABILITY OF BANKS FOR AID TO TAX EVASION

The concept of regulatory liability
German criminal law knows no criminal liability of legal persons, since it limits criminal liability to natural persons. 4 The reason for the rejection of corporate criminal liability in German law stems from the attachment of criminal liability to the personal guilt of a natural person. 5 Additionally, the concept of corporate criminal liability would not be compatible with the nulla poena sine culpa principle of German criminal law, since "innocent people, such as shareholders, may be forced to suffer the consequences of the corporate penalty along with, or instead of, the persons who were guilty of the offense." 6 However, although there is no corporate criminal liability in Germany, heavy fines can be imposed on entities under s 30 of the Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz 7 (OWiG). This provision states that the responsibility of the owner of a corporation for a regulatory 2 See p 126 of the coalition agreement, available at < www.cdu.de/system/tdf/media/ dokumente?file=1 > (accessed 6 March 2019). Simultaneously, an academic discussion has been taking place. See, for example, M Jahn and F Pietsch, "Der NRW-Entwurf für ein Verbandsstrafengesetzbuch. Eine Einführung in das Konzept und seine Folgefragen" [2015] 10 Zeitschrift für Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik 1, 1 et sqq; K-H Krems, "Der NRW-Gesetzentwurf für ein Verbandstrafengesetzbuch. Gesetzgeberische Konzeption und Konzeptiom" [2015] offence causes the law to attribute the offence to the company, 8 which is the reason why a fine can be imposed against the corporation. In comparison to criminal offences, regulatory offences do not allow for the imprisonment of offenders and involve less ethical disapproval and moral stigma. 9 Given certain prominent examples of corporate misbehaviour in Germany in recent times, the relative blameworthiness of regulatory and criminal offending is a live issue but cannot be pursued further within the confines of this article. It should be noted, however, that the OECD has recommended that Germany should take measures to improve the deterrent effect of its regulatory sanctions. 10 In any event, the German law can serve as a case study regarding how a jurisdiction without corporate criminal liability may utilise functionally equivalent administrative (or regulatory) sanctions to address the facilitation of tax evasion by banks.
11 Recent scholarship in fact indicates a trend towards the "intertwining of fines of criminal and administrative nature" across a number of jurisdictions. 12 In addition, for efficiency reasons, a number of systems have departed from criminal sanctions in favour of "parallel enforcement regimes", especially those involving administrative law. 13 However, all systems have in common that they want to persuade companies to implement organisational structures designed to prevent the commission of corporate offences. It is clear that the potential sanctions motivate companies to improve their compliance structures in order to avoid the imposition of those sanctions.
14 In this respect, the most relevant regulatory offence in the German context is, without question, s 130(1) of OWiG. This provision states:
"Whoever, as the owner of an operation or undertaking, intentionally or negligently omits to take the supervisory measures required to prevent contraventions, within the operation or undertaking, of duties incumbent on the owner and the violation of which carries a criminal penalty or a regulatory fine, shall be deemed to have committed a regulatory offence in a case where such contravention has been committed as would have been prevented, or made much more difficult, if there had been proper supervision. The required supervisory measures shall also comprise appointment, careful selection and surveillance of supervisory personnel." 15 Consequently, s 130(1) OWiG is an omission offence. Furthermore, both the negligent and the intentional violation of supervisory duties may result in the imposition of a fine.
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In general, the "owner" in s 130(1) OWiG means the proprietor of a business. Notwithstanding this, in the case of banks, which are mostly organised as stock corporations, the term "owner" relates to its executive committee (otherwise known as its management board). 17 According to s 76(1) Aktiengesetz (AktG) 18 the executive committee is to manage the affairs of the company on its own responsibility. A regulatory liability requires a wilful or negligent failure to take supervisory measures. This in turn triggers the regulatory liability of the company under ss 30 and 130(1) OWiG. It follows from this that a bank is not vicariously responsible for the acts of its employees within this context, but is instead liable because their executive committee has made violations of law possible by neglecting its supervisory duties. Any employee of the corporation could be a violator of the law. External collaborators can also be relevant offenders, provided that they are in charge of company matters and the company has a right to give them instructions. 19 At the same time, it is necessary that the delinquent employee has acted for the corporation and not as a private individual in his own interest. 20 Accordingly, regulatory liability of the bank for the actions of its employee is excluded if the employee acted in his own self-interest and obviously It must be highlighted that aiding in the sense of s 27(1) StGB is any action that objectively promotes the accomplishment of the offender's crime. Moreover, the criminal liability of the accomplice under s 27(1) StGB presupposes a criminal act of the offender, which must have at least been attempted. 25 It would therefore be sufficient for criminal liability of the accomplice, if he promoted the offender's crime in its preparatory stage. 26 At the same time, the aiding of the accomplice does not need to be causally responsible for the success of the offender's crime. 27 Furthermore, the required conditional intention of an accomplice can be assumed if he knows the criminal act of the offender in its essential characteristics and if he acts in the knowledge that his conduct promotes the crime of the offender. 28 Notwithstanding this, it is not necessary for the accomplice to know every detail of the crime. 29 And it is irrelevant whether the accomplice seeks the success of the crime or if he does not want it to be committed. 30 The only relevant aspect is that his aid facilitates the offender's crime, and that the accomplice is aware of this. 31 As a result of those considerations, it can be noted that it is sufficient for the criminal liability of the accomplice if his aid proves to have increased the risk of the realisation of the offence. 32 However, if the accomplice does not know that his actions are being used by the offender to commit an offence, his assistance might not be considered as aid under s 27(1) of StGB. 33 An exception to this exists if the accomplice has recognised that the risk of the commission of an offence is very high. In this respect, the accomplice must have made an effort to assist an offender who was apparently willing to commit a crime in order for the accomplice to make himself criminally liable. 34 b. Criminal liability of bank employees for aid to tax evasion (i). The problem of neutral actions. However, the question arises whether employees of a bank can be prosecuted in the context of their professional activity for aiding tax evasion. In particular, it has proved to be problematic whether aid to tax evasion can also be met by neutral behaviour, such as everyday services like the transfer of money on foreign accounts. 35 The courts consider that an extensive interpretation of externally neutral aid would lead to legal uncertainty and this is also the prevailing view among commentators. 36 It is for this reason that they link the punishability of neutral actions, which are typical of the occupation, to the inner volition of the accomplice. 37 Thus, the one who is performing a neutral act with the intent to promote the crime of the offender makes himself criminally liable as an accomplice. 38 (ii). The rulings of the Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof). Apart from these considerations, the offender must have made a false tax return to be criminally liable for tax evasion under s 370(1) of AO. However, a bank and its employees are not involved in preparing the offender's tax return. It is the responsibility of each taxpayer to decide whether or not to disclose all tax-relevant facts in his or her tax return. 39 Irrespective of this, employees of banks can provide aid to tax evasion of their clients. The decisive factor is that aid to tax evasion can be provided by employees of banks in a preparatory stage. 40 In particular, the Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) ruled that a bank employee who assisted a taxpayer in disguising his cash payments from a German bank account to a foreign account would be criminally liable, if he knew that the customer wanted to evade taxes in this way. 41 Notwithstanding this, the bank employee would not be liable to prosecution if he only considers it possible that the bank client wants to evade taxes. A bank employee would, nevertheless, be criminally liable if he thought it highly likely that the bank client wanted to evade taxes and he assisted him anyway. 42 In this regard, reference can be made to a decision of the BGH from last year. 43 The BGH decided in this appeal that the decision of the district court Frankfurt/Main, which had sentenced employees of Deutsche Bank (for aiding a tax evasion) to imprisonment, was lawful. The district court had sentenced them because they had organised extensive trading in emission rights in 2009 and 2010, in which a group of offenders had evaded sales taxes to the value of hundreds of millions of Euros. The court ruled that the employees of Deutsche Bank would have realised that the offender group wanted to evade taxes, if they had carried out an adequate risk analysis.
Compliance system as opportunity for exculpation
As a result, it is decisive for the avoidance of fines under ss 130(1) and 30 OWiG that the banks have taken measures that are necessary to make aiding tax evasion more difficult. 44 In other words, it is up to the banks to implement efficient criminal compliance systems to prevent or immediately detect crimes committed by their employees. 45 The criminal compliance system must identify and assess criminal liability risks and embrace a risk avoidance strategy. Moreover, the criminal compliance system must continuously monitor the corporate activities of the bank staff for criminal conduct. 46 However, the executive committee does not have to guarantee complete monitoring. The scope of the monitoring obligations is determined by the reasonableness and the practical feasibility of the monitoring. 47 Nonetheless, the executive committee must secure regular spot checks. 48 Finally, the executive committee needs to set up a whistle-blowing system to encourage employees to report criminal conduct. 45 In this regard, the District Court of Munich has ruled most recently that members of the executive committee of a corporation have to ensure, that the company is supervised in such a way that no violations of the law, such as bribes to officials of a foreign state or to foreign private individuals occur. Moreover, the court stated in its ruling that the members of the executive committee only fulfil their supervisory obligations if they set up an effective compliance system. See District Court of Munich I, Court decision from 10 December 2013 -5 HK O 1387/10 -published in [2014] 17 Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht 345. 46 Bock, supra, note 15, 264, 270 et sqq. 47 Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf, Court decision from 12 November 1998 -2 Ss (OWi) 385/98 -(OWi) 112/98 III -published in [1999] 19 NStZ-RR 151. 48 Bock, supra, note 15, 277. 49 Bock, supra, note 44, 732 et sqq.
In this regard the BGH has ruled that an effective criminal compliance system can significantly reduce any possible fine under s 30 OWiG, even if an employee has committed an offence. However, in order to be subject to a reduced fine, the executive committee must rigorously eliminate the weaknesses in the company´s compliance system following the disclosure of legal violations of employees.
51 Compared with this, a fine up to €500,000 might be imposed on a corporation, if the executive committee negligently violated its supervisory duties. 52 Yet it is possible for fines for intentional or negligent violations to be higher still. Section 130(3) sentence 2 OWiG refers to s 30(2) sentence 3 OWiG, and the latter provision states: "If the Act refers to this provision, the maximum amount of the regulatory fine shall be multiplied by ten for the offences referred to in the Act". Accordingly, a fine up to €10,000,000 can be imposed on a corporation if the executive committee intentionally violated its supervisory duties under s 130(1) OWiG. In the case of a negligent violation of supervisory duties, the maximum amount of the fine is €5,000,000. However, the particular amount of the fine to be imposed is determined in accordance with s 130(3) OWiG. The decisive factor for the scope of the fine is the individual allegation against the executive committee of the corporation, whereby the severity of the violation of the duty of supervision is accorded pivotal importance. In the light of the purpose of s 130(1) OWiG, the execution, the significance and seriousness of the violation must also be taken into account. 53 Another factor for determining the amount of the fine is the financial situation of the company. In particular, the amount of the fine must not threaten the existence of the company.
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To give just one recent example: The district court of Düsseldorf has ruled in a significant decision that a fine can be imposed under s 130(1) OWiG 55 against a bank, which has trained its employees to help the bank's clients with their tax evasion. The decisive issue in this court ruling was the fact that a member of the executive committee knew about this practice and approved it. The district court imposed a fine of €149,000,000 on the bank in this regulatory proceeding. However, it must be stressed that the actual fine was only €1,000,000. The remaining balance of €148,000,000 is only a levy on the financial benefits that the Bank has acquired as a result of its violation of its supervisory duties under s 130(1) OWiG. 56 In this respect s 17(4) OWiG states:
"The regulatory fine shall exceed the financial benefit that the perpetrator has obtained from commission of the regulatory offence. If the statutory maximum does not suffice for that purpose, it may be exceeded".
III. UK: CORPORATE OFFENCE OF FAILURE TO PREVENT THE FACILITATION OF TAX EVASION
1. General The UK CFA 2017, ss 45 and 46, which came into force on 30 September 2017, punish the failure to prevent the facilitation of tax evasion. 57 These two criminal offences, 58 which are designed as strict liability offences, seek to circumvent difficulties prosecuting companies under the background criminal law due to the shortcomings of the identification doctrine. 59 This doctrine requires that a company can only be liable for a crime if the necessary acts and state of mind of the crime can be imputed to those who were the "directing mind and will" of the company at the relevant time. 60 This is a particularly difficult test to meet for the prosecution of large companies, including banks.
61 By utilising strict liability, the CFA provisions make it simpler to prosecute banks and other corporate entities that are complicit in the evasion of taxes. In particular, ss 45 and 46 enable the courts to impose fines on bodies corporate and partnerships if their employees have aided third parties with tax evasion.
The domestic variant provided by s 45 CFA covers the failure to prevent facilitation of UK tax evasion offences. Notwithstanding this, the imposition of a corporate fine does not require that the company being sanctioned is based in the UK. 62 Foreign companies can also be sanctioned pursuant to s 45 CFA if they evade UK taxes.
63 By contrast, s 46 CFA deals with the failure to prevent facilitation of foreign tax evasion offences, and can be referred to as the foreign variant. For this latter offence, there must be a particular connection with the UK: that the body is incorporated (or partnership formed) under the law of any part of the UK; that the entity carries on business or part of a business in the UK; or any conduct constituting part of the foreign tax evasion facilitation offence takes place in the UK. 64 2. The domestic variant under s 45 CFA Section 45(5) CFA provides that "UK tax evasion facilitation offence" means an offence under the law of any part of the UK consisting of: (a) being knowingly concerned in, or in taking steps with a view to, the fraudulent evasion of a tax by another person;
(b) aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of a UK tax evasion offence, or (c) being involved art and part in the commission of an offence consisting of being knowingly concerned in, or in taking steps with a view to, the fraudulent evasion of a tax. A relevant body, such as a bank or other body corporate, 65 is guilty of an offence of failing to prevent the facilitation of UK tax evasion if a person acting in the capacity of a person associated with the relevant body commits a UK tax evasion facilitation offence. 66 The person associated with the relevant body may be a natural or legal person. 67 A person acts in the capacity of a person associated with an entity if the person is: (a) an employee of the entity who is acting in the capacity of an employee; (b) an agent of the entity (other than an employee) and is acting in the capacity of an agent; or (c) any other person who performs services for or on behalf of the entity who is acting in the capacity of a person performing such services. 68 The relevant body will not, however, be liable if the person is acting outside the context of the relationship with the relevant body on a "frolic of their own" in facilitating someone else's tax evasion. 69 Relevant associations are especially likely to arise in situations involving financial advisers, financial brokers, legal entities and individuals providing tax-related advisory services or conducting transactions, since ss 45 and 46 CFA clearly have within their sights law firms, banks and tax consultants dealing with third-party tax matters. It is not decisive for the question of association whether the person is employed by the company or integrated in its organisational structure. The question of association must rather be determined on a case-by-case basis and depends on the capacity in which the person is acting, not just on the formal position held. 70 Nevertheless, if an associated person has acted only in selfinterest, then this will need to be proved to negate the association and thereby show that the person was not acting for the entity and consequently that there is no criminal liability under s 45.
Section 45(2) CFA provides that it is a defence to the s 45 offence to prove that when the UK tax evasion facilitation offence was committed, the entity, such as a bank, "had in place such prevention procedures as it was reasonable in all the circumstances to expect [the entity] to have in place", or that "it was not reasonable in all the circumstances to expect [the entity] to have any prevention procedures in place." The company must, therefore, show that it has taken sufficient measures to prevent associated persons facilitating the tax evasion of third parties. Consequently, the company must provide evidence that it has implemented a suitable criminal compliance system. 72 The question that always arises in this respect is which criminal compliance system is suitable. According to the HMRC Guidance, each company has to consider the risks in relation to its own business. 73 Companies must assess which persons associated with them have the possibility of facilitating tax evasion of third parties. Furthermore, companies must conduct a risk analysis of their financial products and services. Where appropriate, companies are also obliged to carry out a tax risk analysis with regard to their clients' residences, the location of their clients' investment capital and the country of destination of the respective investments. 74 Subsequently, companies must take the necessary preventive measures as a result of their risk assessment, insofar as they are considered proportionate. There are six guiding principles provided by the HMRC with respect to the development of measures to prevent facilitation: (i) the proportionality of risk-based prevention procedures; (ii) top level commitment; (iii) risk assessment; (iv) due diligence; (v) communication; and (vi) monitoring and review.
In addition, the explanatory notes accompanying the CFA state that "only reasonable or proportionate procedures, as opposed to fool-proof or excessively burdensome procedures (…)" are required. 75 However, there is still a significant amount of uncertainty as to what is reasonable or proportionate in a given context. 76 Aside from this, the companies are obliged to continuously monitor their compliance systems.
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Perhaps the greatest consequence of the legislative provisions is the introduction of compliance systems by banks and other major corporate entities, which should assist in minimising their complicity in tax evasion.
In the event that an entity is found guilty of an offence under s 45, the entity is liable to pay a fine and this is without limit for a conviction on indictment. 78 Given that the 71 78 Section 45(8). As noted by Wheater and Proudlock, supra, note 59, 184, orders for confiscation of assets and deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) may also be used. DPAs enable a prosecution to be suspended for a period of time so long as particular conditions are met. There are also potentially regulatory sanctions that can result from relevant behaviour by corporate entities: see Corfield and Schaefer, supra, note 58, 1032.
legislation was only recently introduced, there is not yet any case law to flesh out the particular factors that will be taken into account when considering appropriate levels of fines.
3. The foreign variant under s 46 CFA As noted above, s 46 CFA involves failure to prevent facilitation of foreign tax evasion offences. According to s 46(5) CFA, a foreign tax evasion offence means conduct which: (a) amounts to an offence under the law of a foreign country, (b) relates to a breach of a duty relating to a tax imposed under the law of that country, and (c) would be regarded by the courts of any part of the United Kingdom as amounting to being knowingly concerned in, or in taking steps with a view to, the fraudulent evasion of that tax. In other respects, the conditions within s 45 CFA also apply to s 46. This includes with respect to the required involvement of an associated person, the defence available and the penalty for the offence. However, two additional factual conditions must be fulfilled for liability under s 46. The respective company must have a nexus with the UK and there must exist dual criminality. The required nexus between a company and the UK can be assumed if the foreign entity is incorporated under UK law, operates from the UK or has a UK branch.
79 It can also be assumed if a person associated with a foreign company has carried out the facilitation of tax evasion in the UK. 80 With respect to dual criminality in the sense of s 46(5) CFA, this requires that the tax evasion is punishable under the tax criminal law of the respective foreign state and that the tax evasion would be punishable under UK law if the tax evasion concerned UK taxes and not foreign ones. 81 Nevertheless, the application of liability to entities for failing to prevent the facilitation of foreign tax evasion is broad in its scope and a welcome means by which the UK is showing its willingness to recognise the problems caused by tax evasion on a global scale.
IV. COMPARISON BETWEEN THE GERMAN AND UK APPROACHES
Points of similarity
Based on the discussion above, it will be apparent that there are various ways in which the relevant UK and German law already align. First of all, the German and UK approaches make the imposition of fines subject to the violation of the respective bank's own supervisory duties. Although in Germany, in contrast to the UK, no corporate criminal liability exists, the attribution of employees' punishable behaviour to their employers leads to similar results. In this respect, it must be emphasised that no vicarious responsibility (in the strict sense) applies in either country. Liability does not arise 79 Laird, supra, note 63, 936. 80 ibid. 81 For discussion, see Corfield and Schaefer, supra, note 58, 1032. merely because of the attribution of an employee's punishable behaviour to the company. Instead, as already mentioned, the imposition of fines in both countries is linked to the violation of the company's own supervisory duties. At the same time, in both legal systems banks have the opportunity to exculpate themselves through an effective criminal compliance system. In the UK, only proportionate or reasonable steps are required to be taken. This means that corporate criminal liability cannot be assumed if the bank could have prevented the facilitation to tax evasion only with disproportionate effort. The same approach basically applies in Germany, where the BGH has already ruled that the subsequent elimination of weaknesses of a criminal compliance system following the disclosure of legal violations committed by employees can significantly reduce possible fines.
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Apart from this, German and UK tax crime law make similar demands as regards aiding tax evasion. 83 Interestingly, the requirements for association of employees with their employers are also in line in both countries. This becomes clear especially with regard to collaborators. An association can be affirmed in Germany if the external collaborators are in charge of company matters and the bank has a right to give them instructions. The same requirements apply in the UK. Simultaneously, it is necessary in both countries that delinquent employees acted for the company and not for themselves. If an employee acted only in his own interest, an association with the company is insufficient to confer liability on the company in both jurisdictions.
Points of divergence
On the other hand, there are also some significant differences between the approaches. First, the fines that can be imposed in Germany are limited. The maximum amount of a fine is €10,000,000. In this respect, it has to be stressed that the traditionally low fines in Germany have proven in the past to be of little suitability to prevent quasi-criminal behaviour in companies. 84 In contrast, unlimited fines can be imposed in the UK against banks for their failure to prevent the facilitation of tax evasion. Obviously, this should increase the willingness of banks to implement effective criminal compliance systems and help prevent the facilitation of tax evasion.
Even more decisive, however, is the fact that the scope of s 46 CFA is well beyond that of ss 30 and 130(1) OWiG, since s 46 CFA allows the sanctioning of the evasion of foreign taxes, if both the UK nexus and dual criminality requirements are met. Sections 30 and 130(1) OWiG, on the other hand, sanction only the evasion of German taxes, which is due to the fact that the territorial scope of the OWiG is limited to German territory. 85 In this regard, the wide scope of the UK corporate offences of failure to prevent the facilitation of tax evasion seems to be more appropriate in the post-Panama Papers world, as those documents revealed that national approaches to tackling tax evasion by globally operating companies may be ineffective in a number of respects.
Reform of German law on the UK model?
The question arises, therefore, whether the German position should be reformed in line with the UK approach. In this respect, it would appear reasonable to extend the territorial applicability of the OWiG in a manner similar to the CFA. The Panama Papers have exemplified that a less domestically limited approach is desirable. At the same time, an increase in the maximum amount of fines should be considered, since an increase might promote the effective execution of criminal compliance systems in corporations. 86 This demand also corresponds to the position of the OECD. 87 Concerning these two matters, the UK approach could serve as a model. 88 Notwithstanding this, the concept of strict liability is no model for German law. In German law, it is irrevocable that the imposition of a fine requires guilt. An objective responsibility that disregards subjective guilt would be unconstitutional in Germany. 89 Furthermore, despite the suitable extra moral opprobrium that may accompany a crime rather than regulatory liability, it is not possible to impose criminal liability on a bank itself under German law, in the manner that exists in UK law.
However, the imposition of criminal liability on a bank itself is not necessarily required. According to our view, it would instead be suitable if the OWiG were adapted in the above-noted ways. 90 Apart from this, it would also be desirable if new forms of sanctions were introduced to the OWiG. Sanctions in the form of official instructions or the exclusion of tax benefits or subsidies would be acceptable. 91 Moreover, the imposition of a time limited operating ban on responsible company divisions would also be an appropriate sanction. Thus, additional incentives would be created for corporations to comply with the law. 92 With regard to banks, these sanctions are expected to prove more effective than regulatory fines. This already follows from the fact that the current regulatory fines do not have a particularly deterrent effect in view of potential high profits through criminal activities. 93 However, these considerations are not limited to Germany, they also apply to those states that have a concept of corporate criminal liability, such as the UK.
Another relevant aspect is the deepening of international cooperation in order to tackle tax evasion effectively. Tax offences often have an international dimension, eg if assets are hidden abroad. It is for this reason that an effective fight against tax evasion requires a global approach. Most noteworthy in this respect are the reform initiatives of the OECD. The OECD is calling for an international agreement to cooperate on the exchange of information, the submission of documents, the collection of evidence and the transfer of persons for questioning. At the same time, the OECD advocates the implementation of arrangements for the freezing and confiscation of assets and joint investigations. 94 Council Directive 2011/16/EU on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation and the OECD Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters can be seen as initial steps to achieve these goals. 95 Notwithstanding this, the Panama Papers and other more recent developments have made it clear that there is still a long way to go before tax evasion can be successfully combatted on a global level.
V. CONCLUSION
Certain aspects regarding the liability of banks for aiding or failing to prevent the facilitation of tax evasion in German and UK law are comparable. Fines are imposed when banks have failed to fulfil their duties and adequate compliance regimes can enable those banks to escape liability. Banks are well placed to manage the risk of associated persons providing services in a way that could enable others to evade tax. The regulatory environments in Germany and the UK require banks to adopt appropriate measures for dealing with the relevant risk, which should diminish the opportunities that other parties have for evading taxes.
Yet, in a number of respects, the liability of banks under the equivalent laws in Germany and the UK appear highly divergent. There is no criminal liability for corporate entities under German law nor strict liability. By contrast, both of these elements are part of the UK law. The fact that ss 45 and 46 CFA are strict liability provisions facilitates investigation and prosecution. Unlike the UK position, many proceedings for violations of supervisory duties under ss 30 and 130(1) OWiG are put to an end in the preliminary stage by paying a fine. This is due to the reason that the subjective facts of the offence are difficult to prove. The UK approach has a wider scope and can be expected to be more effective to prevent aid to tax evasion committed by bank employees and other associated persons. The reasons for this are the availability of unlimited fines and the potentially global scope of ss 45 and 46 CFA.
The reform of the German law is currently being considered and the approach in the UK can serve as a model of reform to a limited extent. Although it is not possible to introduce corporate criminal liability or strict liability due to wider German law, removing restrictions on fines and extending the scope of liability under German law to tax evasion of non-German taxes would be possible. Given that it has proved highly problematic to obtain international consensus regarding liability for tax evasion, it is desirable for major jurisdictions like Germany and the UK to at least have wide-ranging liability for banks' involvement in facilitating tax evasion.
